Confiscation Update

As we await publication of the Law Commission’s proposals to reform the Confiscation Regime under Part 2 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, Cameron Scott reviews some of the appeal decisions in this area over the last year which suggests that the Court of Appeal adopting a more proportionate approach to some aspects of confiscation.  Cameron Scott is a highly experienced barrister,  whose practice focuses on fraud, money laundering, confiscation and professional regulation. He acts for both defence and prosecution and has been appointed to the CPS Specialist Fraud Panel and the Serious Fraud Office’s Proceeds of Crime Panel. He has been involved in complex Money Laundering and Confiscation cases for many years both in the UK and abroad and previously authored the Proceeds of Crime chapter in the Hong Kong edition of Archbold  Article In September 2020, The Law Commission published its 720 page consultation paper[1] setting out what some might suggest are conservative proposals to make the Confiscation regime more effective, fairer and less complex.  The Commission’s conclusions are expected to be published in Spring 2021.  In the meantime, appeals from confiscation cases continue to take up a disproportionate amount of the Court of Appeal’s list, but there is a sense that the sometimes aggressive approach taken by prosecutors in pursuing confiscation is being tempered by proportionality and common sense. It is now 8 years since R v Waya[2] established that confiscation orders must be proportionate, which was codified in 2015 through the introduction of POCA section 6(5).  This article highlights a few of last year’s appeal decisions. In R v Andrewes[3] the Court of Appeal provided further guidance on the meaning of “disproportionate”. Mr Andrewes, a 63 year-old man of otherwise good character, had managed to land several senior health posts, including the boards of two NHS Trusts , on the basis of a CV which contained “a series of staggering lies”.  He was duly convicted of one count of obtaining a pecuniary advantage by deception and two counts of fraud. In the confiscation proceedings, the benefit was found to be £643,602 – representing his entire salary from the various roles – and he was ordered to pay £96,737 (representing his recoverable amount). This was held on appeal to be wholly disproportionate on the basis that he had, throughout his periods of employment, properly performed his duties in return for the remuneration he received.  Thus, in effect, he had made restoration and a confiscation order would operate as a double recovery. Reference was made to R v Sale [4], in which the owner of an air conditioning company was convicted of corruption following payment of bribes to obtain contracts with Network Rail.  A confiscation order representing the entire turnover of these contracts was held to be disproportionate since the services had been provided.  A proportionate order would have been for the amount of profit. In a parting shot, the Court reminded prosecutors that they have a discretion as to whether to seek confiscation and suggested that they should think long and hard before seeking confiscation in CV fraud cases! However, a similar argument  was amongst those made, and rejected in R v Roth[5].  Mr Roth, having been granted planning permission to convert a property into 3 flats, duly built 12.  The benefit for confiscation was £527,877, being the total rent received for all the properties over a 53-month period. The Defendant argued that this was disproportionate as the tenants had received full value for the rent and, at most, benefit should be limited to the net profit.  The court ( Davis J, giving the judgement, as he did in Andrewes) disagreed. Two other grounds of appeal were also rejected: First, that since the charge referred only to breach on particular date, benefit should be limited to the rent on that day. However, it was held that this was a continuing offence; and, Second, that the rent received was not benefit from criminal conduct but was in fact legitimate income from lawful tenancies (see Sumal and Sons (Properties) Ltd v London Borough of Newham[6]). This latter ground was dismissed with the portentous comment “we hope that this will be the last time an argument of this kind is advanced on this basis in confiscation proceedings in [this] context”. In another housing case, R v Bajaj[7], the Defendants were convicted of breaches of various regulations under the Housing Act 2004 relating to two HMOs.  The properties, licensed for 8 occupants, were each rented out to up to 20 tenants and described as grossly overcrowded and squalid.  The Defendants, however, benefited both from flawed drafting of the charges and a flawed argument on confiscation: The Crown sought confiscation of over £917,000 based on the estimated cost of providing compliant accommodation for the additional 12 tenants (which would essentially have involved either building a new house or providing hotel accommodation!).  This, it was argued, was the pecuniary advantage obtained by the Defendants. However, the Court of Appeal rejected this approach as “too broad and speculative”.  It was suggested that the benefit could have been calculated by reference to the cost of compliance with the regulations for 8 occupants (a figure of only £14,305). Ultimately, the benefit was assessed as the rent received from the tenants and, fortuitously for the defendants, because the offences had been charged by reference to a single day, rather than over a period, this amount was only £200 – the Court helpfully suggested that the offence could have been charged under the Planning Acts to allow for confiscation of rent over the entire period, as in Roth, above. In R v Lowther[8]  the Court considered the recovery of joint benefit and the application of sums recovered under a confiscation order where there was both joint and individual benefit. Three Defendants were convicted on various counts including blackmail and money laundering relating to a good old-fashioned protection racket. The benefit for each defendant included both joint benefit arising from their particular criminal conduct and individual benefit from general criminal conduct applying the statutory assumptions in POCA section 10. The Court indicated there was no presumption that any sums recovered would be applied first to the joint benefit. The case also highlighted the difficulties faced by defendants seeking to discharge the statutory assumptions, even with the aid of a forensic accountant, when faced with large unexplained and undocumented cash transactions.  The Defendants had sought to explain this by reference to their lifestyle as members of the Travelling community. The Court emphasised that the section 10 assumptions put the burden of proof onto defendants to demonstrate that funds came from legitimate sources. R v Munir[9], a drugs conspiracy, illustrated the relevance of a basis of plea in confiscation. The defendant pleaded to possession with intent to supply on a basis, which was not challenged, that he was asked by one of the co-defendants to “hold on to” a binbag containing 1.5kg of cannabis and a confiscation order was imposed which included the street value of the cannabis. On appeal, it was held that it was wrong to include the drugs when calculating benefit because, as confiscation is part of the sentencing exercise, confiscation should have been applied consistently with his basis of plea.  Following R v May[10] he was a mere custodian and did not “obtain” the drugs. Finally, R v Cribben[11] serves as a warning to all of us not to treat the benefit figure as academic in cases where there are no, or limited, available assets. Mr Cribben was the driver in a drugs conspiracy.  In 2008, on the advice of counsel, a benefit figure of over £1,619,232 (the street value of the drugs) and a confiscation order of £1,214 were agreed. It appears not to have been argued that (as in R v May ) he did not “benefit” from the value of the drugs. Mr Cribben duly served his prison sentence and went on to lead a respectable life. He began to make some money and, in 2019, the Crown came after his new “wealth” and sought a redetermination and a further £19,589 under POCA section 22.  Realising that the huge benefit figure would mean any money he ever made in the future would be subject to confiscation, he sought leave to appeal out of time. Fortunately, good sense prevailed and, despite the fact the original benefit figure had been agreed, the Court allowed an out of time redetermination of the benefit figure to £19,589 on the basis that the original determination was analogous to a mistake in law.  The court commented “Counsel in confiscation cases must bear in mind the possibility of a future application under section 22”. This last case perhaps illustrates how draconian and unfair the confiscation regime can be to offenders.  Confiscation orders can hang over their lives like a financial sword of Damocles for many, many years.  This particular issue is addressed by the Law Commission but there is, for the time being, no proposal to limit the Crown’s ability to apply for a redetermination. Whether their proposals in other areas will address the complexity, effectiveness and fairness of the POCA regime remains to be seen and will no doubt be the subject of a further article later in the year.   [1] https://www.lawcom.gov.uk/project/confiscation-under-part-2-of-the-proceeds-of-crime-act-2002/#confiscation-consultation-paper [2] [2012] UKSC 51 [3] [2020] EWCA Crim 1055 [4] [2013] EWCA Crim 1306 [5] [2020] EWCA Crim 967 [6] [2012] EWCA Crim 1840 [7] [2020] EWCA Crim 1111 [8] [2020] EWCA Crim 1387 [9] [2020] EWCA Crim 1549 [10] [2008] UKHL 28 [11] [2020]

Sentencing – An Update

A significant development in sentencing came into force in December 2020. The Sentencing Code 2020 codifies, and will continue to, the myriad of sentencing powers and provisions.  This summary seeks to provide some key pointers as to how to approach the Sentencing Code as well as reflecting briefly on some other key guidelines which have recently been introduced by the Sentencing Council. Marie Spenwyn is a criminal defence practitioner of over twenty years experience defending in cases of the utmost severity.  She is also a Visiting Lecturer with the University of Law and an advocacy trainer.  Along with Dr Bradley Hiller Consultant Forensic Psychiatrist she recently presented an update for Libertas Chambers focusing on the guideline for sentencing offenders with mental disorders. Article Codification is often seen as a concept outwith this jurisdiction.   If that is right then the approach taken to codify – and label as such – sentencing powers and provisions in the Sentencing Code 2020 is a brave move.  Brave or not it is in my view an incredibly useful development which will aid practitioners grappling often with multiple pieces of legislation which found provisions that could come into play in mitigation even for a single offence.  If we take an example of a sentence for an offence where credit for plea is relevant but also where a minimum sentence applies, where there are sentencing guidelines, where there is a qualifying tag leading to the need for days to be credited, where there may be disqualification which could apply we are looking at a number of pieces of separate legislation.  If the case concerns a young person you can immediately increase the sources of provisions for both these key features before you begin to look at the multiple sources for potential sentencing outcomes. The Sentencing Code deals with the procedural aspects of sentencing and not sentencing powers themselves – it remains the position that maximum sentences for offences come from the separate pieces of legislation creating offences.  Helpfully the code looks at the procedure for sentencing from a logical point of view – which gives assistance to the less experienced advocate in terms of where to find things and also what amount to a ‘checklist’ of what to consider.  The Sentencing Act 2020 which brings it into force anticipates that further additions to or amendments of sentencing provisions are inserted so that it is a ‘living’ piece of legislation. The SC applies to all sentences after the 1st December 2020 regardless of date of commission of the offence(s).  As noted above it does not affect in any way maximum sentences more it is the source of overarching framework for sentencing.   It is useful to be able to immediately locate the provisions for what the maximum credit available when a plea is entered to a third strike offence without flicking through a textbook under the offence only to be referred to the ‘sentencing chapter’ and the convoluted sections on minimum sentences.  As an example when dealing with a third strike drug offence you can now go to the chapter three for mitigating features – section 73 dealing with guilty pleas, and to the minimum sentences in chapter seven, specifically s311 for this offence.  Of further note helpfully Schedule 21 (determination of minimum terms for mandatory life sentences) appears in the schedules to the SC as…Schedule 21! The Sentencing Code (SC) does not include the source of every single aspect that might be relevant in a sentencing exercise but what it does do – with a logical, structured approach – is provide a guide to where to start. It is designed to work in conjunction with the Sentencing Council Guidelines and the Criminal Procedure Rules as well as the Criminal Practice Directions.  Under Section 59 of the SC the general duty of court as to use of guidelines is clearly set out – this affirms the importance of the advocate being familiar with sentencing guidelines and using them in sentencing exercises.  For a useful view on the SC from David Ormerod see link – https://www.sentencingcouncil.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/The-Sentencing-Code-10-things-to-know-revised-1.pdf Speaking of sentencing guidelines, on the 1st October 2020 a new overarching guideline came into force focusing on the approach to sentencing those who have mental disorders, neurological impairment or developmental disorders.  The majority of offence specific guidelines refer in the mitigating features ‘boxes’ to whether there are any features of the case peculiar to the offender as to mental disorders but without any real assistance as to how reference can properly be made during mitigation to exactly what the resulting impact on determining sentence should be.  This guideline is important for anyone representing those with any condition which can be included in the broad categories the guideline utilises.  It provides support for a plea in mitigation that properly should encompass a real focus on those elements and their relevance to often both offence and offender.  As is often the case the guideline may be most useful when focusing on the difference between community disposals or suspended sentences as being appropriate alternatives to immediate custody. The new firearms guideline applies as of the 1st January 2021.  All practitioners will know that dealing with firearms cases has flung us back on R v Avis and the key points therein, but without the more specific assistance that is now common-place in many other areas with offence specific guidelines. The new guideline will therefore be welcome to some though it remains to be seen quite how it will be applied.  It is also an area where the Sentencing Code and the interplay with the guidelines should be of some use – as noted above locating the source of minimum provisions which apply to some firearms should be more straightforward [Sentencing Code at s311]. It is a busy time for sentencing updates and reviews.  On the 21st January 2021 the Sentencing Council published a ‘new’ sentencing guideline which impacts upon drugs offences.  Practitioners should be alert to where these changes will alter the now familiar  categorisations from the 2012 guidelines that apply to the key drug offences under the broad umbrella of importation, production and supply offences.  The new guidelines come into force on the 1st April 2021.  The focus of the revised guidelines is largely two-fold – firstly seeking to provide more assistance as to the recognition of how frequently vulnerable people are exploited within the spectrum of drugs offences and updating as to the types of drugs vis a vis ‘new drugs’ such as Spice and synthetic drugs, as well as changes in the potential yield and purity of some drugs with the consequential impact on the assessment of harm. There is more to come; a consultation is underway focusing on sentencing modern slavery offences, draft guidelines have been published for trade mark offences.  Watch this space for further updates. Download Article now